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Abstract
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures.
We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis-
lature provide widely diﬀerent incentives for interest groups to acquire and
transmit policy relevant information.
The paper also shows a diﬀerence in the opportunity to aﬀect policy through
lobbying between a parliamentary legislature and a legislature with low voting
cohesion, such as the U.S. Congress. We show that the incentives to lobby a
parliamentary legislature are much lower than to lobby Congress. The results
provide a rationale for why lobby groups are more active in the U.S. Congress.
The key institutional feature to explain the diﬀerent behavior of lobby groups
is the vote of conﬁdence procedure, which creates voting cohesion in a parlia-
mentary system across policy issues. We show that the ﬂexibility of creating
majorities in the Congress creates an incentive for interest groups to play an
active role in the design of policy in the congressional system, while the voting
cohesion in the parliamentary system dissuades interest group’s incentive to
engage in information provision.
We are grateful to David Baron, Massimo Morelli and Christian Schultz for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft.
1 Introduction
Studies of interest group inﬂuence on legislative decision making fall into two
categories. In the ﬁrst category, interest groups oﬀer campaign contributions
or other politically valuable resources in exchange for services or legislative
favors. Many of these models study how a group optimally allocates its
resources between the various members of the legislature in order to secure
the required support (Snyder 1991, Stratmann 1992, Groseclose and Snyder
1996, Baron 1999, Dharmapala 2000).
Papers in the second category study the extent to which interest groups
can aﬀect policy outcomes by providing relevant information to the lawmaker.
Interest groups have an incentive to oﬀer information if they can inﬂuence
the outcome in their favor (Calvert 1985, Austen-Smith and Wright 1992,
Austen-Smith 1995, Lohmann 1994, 1998, Ball 1995, Laﬀont 1999, and oth-
ers).
Informational theories focus conspicuously on a single decision maker and
do not address the fact that in a legislature decisions are made by compro-
mise and via (some form of) majority rule. The institutional structure of
the legislature, whose importance is extensively studied by the theories of
legislative decision making, is absent in all papers of informational lobbying
we are aware of.
This paper analyzes informational lobbying in the context of multi-member
legislatures. We show that the diﬀerence between a single decision maker and
a legislature can be crucial for the interest group to provide information at
all. As we suggested in an earlier paper (Bennedsen and Feldmann 1998), if
an uninformed lobby with known and certain preferences confronts a single
decision maker who is uncertain about the state of the world, it prefers not
to search for information. The reason is that the beneﬁt of providing posi-
tive information from the lobby’s point of view is oﬀset by the cost incurred
when the policy maker updates her beliefs as the lobby does not provide any
information.
An interest group that lobbies a majoritarian institution must be con-
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cerned with the eﬀect of its information on the composition of the majority
that supports a proposal. We show in this paper that the majority coali-
tion may change in response to the information provided, and that the lobby
group can internalize the beneﬁt of providing positive information without
bearing the cost of negative signals. Therefore, it may be beneﬁcial for a
lobby to engage in informational lobbying vis-a`-vis a legislature, even if it is
not so for a group that faces a single decision maker.
A second focus of the paper is to explain how diﬀerent legislative struc-
tures change interest groups’ incentives to lobby the legislature. Empirical
evidence suggests a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent role of private interests in the leg-
islative process in the United States and in European parliamentary democ-
racies. Large and well-entrenched interest groups form important constituen-
cies in European parliamentary decision making. By comparison, however,
Capitol Hill teems with lobbying organizations and lobbyists trying to in-
ﬂuence political decisions in their favor. Observers of the policy process are
often struck by the intensity of lobbying—or lack thereof—in the system on
the other side of the Atlantic.
Our model allows a comparison of the incentive to lobby a parliamentary
legislature versus a legislature with low voting cohesion, such as the U.S.
Congress. As others (e.g. Huber 1995) have argued, a crucial diﬀerence
between the two systems is the vote of conﬁdence procedure, a mechanism
that allows the proposer of a bill in the parliamentary system to link the
government’s survival to the passage of the bill. Diermeier and Feddersen
(1998) show that this procedure engenders discipline within the governing
coalition and leads to a high degree of voting cohesion in the parliamentary
system.
The results derived in our informational lobbying game provide a rationale
for the diﬀerent intensity of legislative lobbying in the two systems. We show
that the voting cohesion induced by the conﬁdence procedure diminishes
the ability of information to change the policy coalition. As a result the
incentive to lobby the legislature in the parliamentary system is reduced,
and lobbying activity may be diverted to other parts of the policy process,
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such as the ministerial level or the bureaucracy. The relative importance of
U.S. Members of Congress and their exposure to lobbyists may exactly be a
consequence of their low coalitional loyalty.
Our model assumes that legislators care about policy outcomes and up-
date their beliefs rationally, i.e. according to Bayes’s Rule. It might be
tempting to argue that legislators do not learn from information they do
not receive, i.e., that they fail to update their beliefs in this situation. This
paper takes a game theoretic approach and assumes that all actors make the
best use of the information available. Another common caveat is that lobby
groups are sometimes thought to be better informed than politicians without
any search eﬀort. While we do consider the case where the group can acquire
the information costlessly, we believe that becoming informed is a conscious
choice for the group, in which case the group considers the consequences
of this choice. A model in which lobby groups are simply “born” with the
relevant information seems less satisfactory on this account.
Persson and Helpman (1998) and Baron (1999) analyze the importance
of legislative structure for interest groups’ lobbying behavior. In both papers
the means of inﬂuence are campaign contributions, or ﬁnancial incentives.
Our analysis extends the comparative institutional analysis of lobbying be-
havior to interest groups’ use of information as means of inﬂuencing policy
outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the generic
structure of the lobbying and legislative game. Section 3 solves the model
for a legislature without the vote of conﬁdence procedure (“congressional
legislature”). We provide a suﬃcient condition for the lobby to engage in
information transmission and argue that this condition is generally satisﬁed.
We then characterize the optimal search strategy for the lobby group in a
large legislature. In Section 4 we introduce the vote of conﬁdence procedure
and show how it reduces the lobby group’s incentive to search for information.
We provide a suﬃcient condition for the lobby not to search at all. Up to
that point the beneﬁt of belonging to the governing coalition is exogenously
given. Section 5 presents a simpliﬁed dynamic version of the model that
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determines the beneﬁt of remaining in the governing coalition endogenously.
We provide a condition for which the introduction of a vote of conﬁdence
procedure strictly decreases the expected beneﬁt from lobbying. Section 6
concludes.
2 A model of lobbying for a public good
We analyze lobbying and the legislative process in a simple model of public
goods provision of distributive nature, i.e. goods whose incidence is local to
geographic districts while being ﬁnanced through general taxation. Exam-
ples may be local highway construction, environmental clean-up or regional
development projects, or grants-in-aid, whose beneﬁts accrue mainly locally
and costs are shared through the general tax bill.1 The beneﬁts accrue di-
rectly to the public and are, via the electoral connection, internalized in the
representative’s decision making. Districts diﬀer in the degree to which their
residents value the public good.
A national interest group that beneﬁts from the provision of public goods
in all districts seeks to promote its overall provision. Such a group might
be the national trade organization of private suppliers or contractors for the
projects to be built, or a national public interest organization such as the
Sierra Club or organized beneﬁciaries like the AARP. In order to promote the
provision of the public good the group can collect decision-relevant informa-
tion about the good’s positive impact in each district and can transmit this
information to the legislators to inﬂuence their policy choice. The decision
to provide information is naturally strategic.
To be speciﬁc, consider a country with n districts of equal size, each
represented by one legislator i = 1 . . . n. We assume that n is odd and deﬁne
N = {1, . . . , n} as the set of legislators.
The legislature decides on the size and distribution of public goods gi
that are to be built in the districts. Let g = (g1, . . . , gn) be the vector of the
1See Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1980) for a discussion of such projects. Weingast, Shepsle
and Johnsen (1981) is a classic model of such pork barrel projects.
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public good allocation and 1
2
G =
∑
i∈N gi the total amount of public good
provided. The total cost C is increasing in gi. For simplicity we assume
that C is a convex function of the total amount of public good, C(g) = 1
2
G2,
which reﬂects the fact that ineﬃciencies or monitoring cost increase with
the size of the federal bureaucracy or that the opportunity cost of taxation
increases with the size of tax levied. Costs are shared equally among the
districts through lump sum taxation, ti =
1
n
C(g).
Each legislator i is interested in net beneﬁts for his or her district and
thus has the utility function
ui = ri gi − 12nG2 + bi i ∈ N.
The beneﬁt of the public good to the district depends on the marginal val-
uation ri, which is a random variable that can take on two values, r with
probability (1− p◦i ) and r with probability p◦i , with r > r (> 0).2 The super-
script ‘◦’ indicates the common ex ante beliefs, that is, before any information
is generated or transmitted. For simplicity let the beliefs be identical for all
districts, p◦i = p
◦. Furthermore, the ri’s are uncorrelated across the dis-
tricts; the interpretation is that the beneﬁt of the public good to the district
depends on some unknown, district speciﬁc properties.
Bills, or proposals to allocate the public good, are introduced by a pro-
poser, or agenda setter. The proposer is chosen randomly from a governing
coalition M ⊂ N .3 The proposed bill g passes if a majority of the legislature
votes for the bill. We refer to the collection of legislators supporting the bill
as policy coalition. As will become clear presently, being member of the gov-
erning coalition and thus having a chance to be selected as proposer conveys
a beneﬁt, bi. For simplicity we ﬁrst assume that bi = b > 0 for all i ∈ M
and bi = 0 for all i /∈ M . In Section 5 we endogenize the value of bi in a
simpliﬁed dynamic version of the lobbying game.
2Any non-degenerate probability distribution on the positive domain would do.
3In the U.S. Congress M is the majority party, in the parliamentary system it is the
governing party or coalition. Since we are not concerned with the election and the coalition
formation stage, we assume M to be determined exogenously by Nature’s move.
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The interest group that beneﬁts from the provision of the public good
can search for high valuation of the public good in the districts (ri = r) and
can strategically provide this information to the legislators. We assume that
the lobby’s decision to search in a district is a long term one, i.e. it is made
before the government coalition or the agenda setter are chosen. To make the
analysis succinct and relatively straightforward, we assume throughout the
paper that the group’s search activity can be observed by the legislature.4
Given the symmetry of the model the lobby is indiﬀerent about in which
district to search. Its search strategy is therefore simply the number of
districts in which to search, s. Furthermore, let Is ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether
0 < s ≤ n.
With this notation we can now state the lobby group’s utility as
uL = G− Is Z,
where Z ≥ 0 is the lobby’s cost of searching for information on the districts’
valuations. We think of the search cost as the organizing cost for engaging
in information search and transmission, and not as a district speciﬁc cost; it
is only incurred once when the group decides to search.5 Note also that the
lobby group is risk neutral in the provision of the public good.
When the interest group searches for information about district i’s val-
uation of the public good, it receives a signal σi, which with probability q
reveals the true beneﬁt, σi = ri, and with probability 1− q is uninformative,
σi = ∅. After the proposer (and in the parliamentary system the government
coalition) is chosen, the interest group sends messages µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) to
the legislature, where µi ∈ {σi, ∅}. In words: the group can transmit the
information it found, or pretend it found nothing, but it cannot “lie” by
forging information.
After the messages are sent, the proposer makes a policy proposal and
submits it to a vote. The only diﬀerence between the congressional and the
4The insight of the present paper carries over to the case where the group’s search
activity cannot be monitored, as shown in Bennedsen and Feldmann (1999).
5This provides the greatest incentive to search in as many districts as possible and is
in no way restrictive.
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parliamentary games in our analysis is that in the parliamentary system the
proposer has the ability to attach the vote of conﬁdence to the proposed
bill. After the proposal the legislature votes on the bill, possibly with vote of
conﬁdence attached, by simple majority rule. If a bill with vote of conﬁdence
is rejected, no public good is awarded and the government steps down, which
results in the loss of bi for all i ∈ M . If a bill without the vote of conﬁdence is
rejected, no public good is awarded and all legislators keep their continuation
values.
The time line of the game is as follows, where the option to choose the
vote of conﬁdence procedure only exists in the parliamentary system.
Group chooses
where to search
Nature draws
M and a  M
Group sends
messages 
a proposes
g = (g1,...,gn),
 chooses vote of
confidence proc.
Legislature
votes on g
3 Lobbying Congress
In this section we consider a legislature without vote of conﬁdence proce-
dure, such as the U.S. Congress. We show that in this case the proposer
crafts policy coalitions opportunistically. The proposer, or agenda setter,
a, allocates the public goods to districts so as to maximize her utility and
therein crafts the most favorable majority among the legislators, irrespective
of party aﬃliation. This is consistent with the empirical observation of low
voting cohesion and decentralized proposal power in the hands of committee
chairmen in the U.S. Congress.
We proceed by solving for the equilibrium strategies by backward induc-
tion. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian Nash. First, we derive the
proposer’s optimal allocation of public goods to the districts for any given
beliefs she might hold about the districts’ valuation of the public good. Let
Eri be the common posterior expectation of ri for all legislators.
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Given her beliefs, the proposer, a, makes a take-it or leave-it policy oﬀer
to the other legislators. If the proposal does not receive the support of a
majority in the legislature, zero public good is provided. Thus, the proposed
allocation must provide at least m ≥ n+1
2
legislators with non-negative utility.
Let C ⊂ N be the set of coalition partners that support a’s proposal, and
C¯ = C ∪ {a}. Since the beneﬁt to be in the governing coalition, bi, does not
depend on the outcome of the vote in the congressional system, we will drop
bi from the legislators’ utility functions in this section. The participation
constraint for coalition partner i ∈ C is,
Eri gi − 12nG2 ≥ 0.
The problem for the agenda setter a is to choose g so as to maximize her
own (expected) payoﬀ, subject to receiving the support from all legislators
in C. First observe that the support of legislators outside of C is not needed
to pass the proposal; thus, it is optimal to set gj = 0, ∀ j /∈ C¯ and to have
the participation constraint binding for each coalition partner:
gi =
1
2nEri
G2, ∀ i ∈ C. (1)
a’s problem thus becomes
max
g
Era
(
G−
∑
i∈C
gi
)
− 1
2n
G2,
subject to (1). Since the maximand is decreasing in the number of coalition
partners in C, it is clear that a optimally forms a minimum winning coalition,
i.e. |C| = n−1
2
= m−1. To simplify notation, deﬁne for all subsets C ⊆ N the
vector rC = (ri)i∈C , the vector of valuations for all districts in C. Substituting
for gj and G above and diﬀerentiating yields the optimal aggregate level of
public good as function of the expected marginal valuations in the majority
districts:
G∗(ErC¯) =
n∑
j∈C¯
1
Erj
. (2)
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Combining (1) and (2) yields the allocations to each district:
gi =


0 for i ∈ C¯
n
2
1
Eri(
∑
j∈C¯
1
Erj
)2
for i ∈ C
n
2
1
Eri
+
∑
j∈C¯
1
Erj
(
∑
j∈C¯
1
Erj
)2
for i = a
(3)
The proposer’s decision internalizes the tax cost imposed on her own
district and the supporting legislator’s, but not the cost to the legislator who
is not member of the supporting majority (Weingast et al. 1981).
In addition to knowing the best response allocation it will be useful for
our analysis later to know the characteristics of the optimal allocations as
functions or the expected marginal beneﬁt. Lemma 1 summarizes the results.
Lemma 1. Assume the proposer maximizes her own payoﬀ subject to being
supported by the majority group C. Then g∗, given by (3), is the optimal pro-
posal given the proposer’s beliefs. G∗(ErC¯) is increasing and strictly concave
in each argument.
Proof. Optimality of (3) has been shown above. The ﬁrst and second deriva-
tives of (2) are:
∂G∗(ErC¯)
∂Eri
=
n
(Eri
∑
j∈C¯
1
Erj
)2
> 0
and
∂2G∗(ErC¯)
∂Eri
2 =
−2n ∑j∈C¯\{i} 1Erj
(Eri
∑
j∈C¯
1
Erj
)3
< 0.
Lemma 1 states that the higher the (expected) marginal beneﬁt in any
majority district, the more public good is provided in the aggregate. Fur-
thermore, the proposer’s optimal response function is concave, a property
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that crucially aﬀects the interest group’s incentive to search, as will become
clear shortly.
We now turn to the lobby’s optimal message strategy and the determi-
nation of legislators’ beliefs and expectations. Given ex ante belief p◦ we
denote district i’s expected marginal valuation E◦ri = (1−p◦) r+p◦ r ≡ E◦r.
Suppose this is each districts’ expected valuation, then the aggregate level
of public good that solves the proposer’s problem, as given by (2), is G◦ =
G∗(E◦rC¯) =
2n
n+1
E◦r.
Now suppose an interest group exists and is believed to have searched
in district i. First, if the group ﬁnds that σi = r, it sends message µi = r
since the optimal level of public good is increasing in Eri and the message
is credible (veriﬁable). Second, suppose the group ﬁnds σi = r. Since G
∗ is
increasing in Eri, the group withholds this negative information and sends an
uninformative message µi = ∅. Similarly if the search is uninformative, which
occurs with probability 1 − q. Thus, when the proposer receives message
µi = ∅ she updates her belief that ri = r, which becomes, using Bayes’s
formula, ps =
p−pq
1−pq (where the subscript s indicates that the group has—or
is believed to have—searched). The posterior expectation for ri is
Esri = (1− ps) r + ps r
=
1− p
1− pq r +
p− pq
1− pq r.
It is clear that due to Bayesian updating Esri < E◦ri < r. Furthermore,
it will be useful to note that E◦r can be written as a linear combination
E◦r = (1− pq) Esr + pq r, which is easy to verify.
Summary of notation:
Eri : expectation of ri (unspeciﬁed).
E◦r : ex ante expectation of ri, when lobby has not searched for infor-
mation.
Esr : posterior expectation of ri when the lobby has searched (or is
believed to have searched) for information and has not revealed
any positive ﬁnding.
ErC : vector of expected Eri containing all i ∈ C ⊆ N .
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Before analyzing the incentive for the interest group to search when facing
an entire legislature, let us ﬁrst derive the incentive for the lobby group vis-
a`-vis a single decision maker.
Lemma 2. Assume n = 1. Then the lobby group never gains from searching.
Proof. The single decision maker a chooses G = ga = Era. The gain from
searching is ∆ua = pq r + (1− pq)Esr − Z − E◦r ≤ 0.
Lemma 2 shows succinctly the eﬀect of Bayesian updating. The expected
beneﬁts of the group’s search and its expected cost in form of Bayesian
updating average exactly to zero. Thus, for any strictly positive search cost
Z the group would strictly prefer not to search for information in the district.
We will now show that the lobby group always has an incentive to search
in some districts when it lobbies a multi-member congressional legislature.
The intuition is that if the agenda setter in the congressional system is strate-
gic in composing the majority that supports her proposal, she will choose to
include the districts with highest expected valuation for the provided dis-
tributive beneﬁts. Thus, if the group’s search in a district is not successful,
then this district will simply not be considered for the agenda setter’s ma-
jority coalition, at no loss to the national interest group.
There are a few wrinkles to this story. First, if the district in which
the group searches is chosen as agenda setter, then the concavity of G∗ with
respect to the agenda setter’s valuation lowers the provision of public good in
expectation. Since the identity of the agenda setter is unknown ex ante, the
group considers the risk that it searches in the setter’s district an expected
cost. We derive a condition on the distribution of public good valuations that
assures that the group wants to search in at least one district (Proposition
1).
Second, the group never wants to search in too many districts. If it
searches in many districts, it raises the chance that districts for which it
found no favorable information need to be included in the majority coalition,
thus lowering the expected total provision of public good. Proposition 2
below characterizes the optimal search strategy in large legislatures.
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Proposition 1. The lobby group always searches in at least one district in
a congressional system with n districts if the following condition holds:
r − 2E◦r
Esr
≤ n. (C1)
Proof. If the group searches in one district, the expected net gain from
searching is
∆G1 = pq
(
G∗(r, E◦rM\{i})−G∗(E◦rM¯)
)
(4)
+ 1−pq
n
(
G∗(Esr, E◦rM)−G∗(E◦rM)
)
,
where the ﬁrst term is the expected gain from having a successful search in
any district, and the second term is the expected loss due to the possibility
of an unsuccessful search in the agenda setter’s district.
Plugging in the G∗ function and simplifying, the net gain becomes
∆G1 = pq n E◦r
r − E◦r
m(E◦r + (m− 1)r) − (1− pq)E◦r
E◦r − Esr
m(E◦r + (m− 1)Esr) .
Notice that pq (r−E◦r) = (1−pq)(E◦r−Esr) since E◦r = (1−pq) Esr+pq r.
Therefore ∆G1 is positive iﬀ
n
E◦r + (m− 1)r ≥
1
E◦r + (m− 1)Esr
mboxor
r − 2E◦r
Esr
≤ n.
Since E◦r and Esr are functions of p, q, r and r, condition C1 delineates a
suﬃcient set of parameters (p, q, r, r, n) for which it is optimal for the group
to search in the congressional system. Since C1 can always be satisﬁed for
a large enough legislature, we conclude that searching is optimal in most
situations in the congressional system.
The above result shows how the incentive to lobby a multi-member con-
gressional legislature is very diﬀerent from lobbying a single decision maker.
In fact, while the interest group can never gain from searching for infor-
mation when confronting a single decision maker, it almost always searches
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when confronting a multi-member majoritarian institution. The reason is
that the majoritarian nature of decision maker enables the group to beneﬁt
from positive information about districts, while at the same time to avoid the
detriment of negative (or nil) information. Since it is in the agenda setter’s
and the lobby group’s interest to identify high-valuation coalition partners,
lobbying is most eﬀective in the multi-member congressional structure.
Optimal search strategy in large legislatures
The previous section shows that an interest group has an incentive to search
for information in the congressional legislature when the legislature is large
and the group reveals the information it ﬁnds strategically to the legislature.
It remains to derive the optimal search strategy. Given that it is in the
group’s interest to search, in how many districts will the group optimally
search?
When the group searches for information, four diﬀerent circumstances
can arise, in each of which searching either raises or lowers the proposer’s
allocation of the public good, or leaves it unaﬀected.
Let K ⊆ N be the set of districts in which the lobby group searches,
k = |K| > 0. Furthermore, let H = {i ∈ K|σi = r and i = a}, i.e. the
non-agenda setter districts for which the group found favorable evidence;
h = |H|.
When the group considers to search in an additional district j ∈ K, the
following four cases can arise:
(1) j = a. If j is chosen to be the agenda setter, the group incurs an
expected loss for searching due to the concavity of G∗ in ra.
The next three cases assume that j = a:
(2) h < n−1
2
, k−h < n−1
2
. If the search in j is successful, j will be included
in the majority; if σj = r, it will not receive positive allocation of public
good. In expectation, G∗ increases.
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(3) h < n−1
2
, k − h ≥ n−1
2
. If the number of unsuccessful searches is larger
than half of the number of districts (excluding the agenda setter’s), then
some districts for which µi = ∅ have to be in the majority coalition,
and search in j increases that number. Thus, additional search reduces
G∗.
(4) h ≥ n−1
2
. The number of districts with successful searches is already
suﬃcient to form a majority. Additional search does not aﬀect G∗.
The expected gain from searching in k districts involves summing up the
best-response public goods allocations resulting from each possible outcome,
i.e. with h ranging from 0 . . . k, and weighting each case by the probability
with which it occurs. Case 1, of course, occurs with a constant probability of
1/n, while the probability of the other three cases is given by the cumulative
of the binomial distribution B(k, pq).
Suppose the lobby group has an incentive to search in at least k districts.
The following Lemma establishes the condition under which the group has
an incentive to increase its search, i.e. to search in at least k + 1 districts.
Lemma 3. If C1 holds, then in the congressional system the group has an
incentive to increase the number of districts k in which it searches whenever
h <
n− 1
2
and k − h < n− 1
2
.
Proof. Suppose the group searches in k districts, and h < n−1
2
, k − h < n−1
2
.
Then, if the group searches in k + 1 districts, the expected change in public
good allocation is
∆Gk = pq
(
G∗(r, ErM\{i})−G∗(ErC¯)
)
+ 1−pq
n
(
G∗(Esr, ErC¯\{a})−G∗(ErC¯)
)
= pq n
(
rE◦r
(h+1)E◦r+(m−h−1)r) − rE◦rhE◦r+(m−h)r
)
+ (1− pq)
(
rE◦rEsr
rE◦r+hE◦rEsr+(m−h−1)rEsr − rE◦rhE◦r+(m−h)r)
)
= pq n rE◦r (r−E◦r)
((h+1)E◦r+(m−h−1)r)(hE◦r+(m−h)r)
− (1−pq) r2 E◦r (E◦r−Esr)
(rE◦r+hE◦rEsr+(m−h−1)rEsr)(hE◦r+(m−h)r)
= pq rE◦r (r−E◦r)
hE◦r+(m−h)r
(
n
(h+1)E◦r+(m−h−1)r − rrE◦r+hE◦rEsr+(m−h−1)rEsr
)
,
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where the last equality follows since E◦r = (1 − pq) Esr + pq r. Denote the
diﬀerence in the parentheses by ψ. The term premultiplying ψ is positive;
hence ∆Gk > 0 if and only if ψ is positive. Rearranging terms we have
ψ(h) = n
E◦r+(m−1)r−h(r−E◦r) − 1E◦r+(m−1)Esr−hEsrr (r−E◦r)
=
n
a− hb −
1
c− hd.
Condition C1 implies that ψ(h) > 0 for h = 0. Furthermore, it is easy to
show that b
a−hb >
d
c−hd . Thus,
ψ′(h) =
nb
(a− hb)2 −
d
(c− hd)2 > 0
and ψ′′(h) =
nb2
(a− hb)3 −
d2
(c− hd)3 > 0.
Thus, as ψ is convex, it is increasing and positive throughout. Hence C1
implies that ∆Gk > 0.
Lemma 3 shows that condition C1 is suﬃcient so that whenever case 2
occurs, the group has an incentive to search in more districts. Countervailing
this incentive, of course, is any (possible) occurrence of cases 3 and 4; this is
considered below.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3 however is that, whenever C1
holds, the group always searches in at least half the districts: If k ≤ n−1
2
,
then the premise of Lemma 3 is guaranteed to be satisﬁed (because cases
3 and 4 cannot occur), and the group has a strict incentive to increase the
number of districts in which it searches until it searches in at least half of
the districts.
Calculating the optimal number of districts using the binomial distribu-
tion of successful and unsuccessful searches is analytically cumbersome. For
large n, however, the calculation becomes relatively simple, since the distribu-
tion of successful searches approaches the expected value pq ·k. Proposition 2
shows that the optimal fraction of districts in which the group searches in
the congressional system converges to a ﬁxed number greater than one-half
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and less than all of districts. The exact proportion depends on the search
parameters (p and q).
Let α = k
n
be the proportion of districts in which the group searches.
Proposition 2. For large n in the congressional system the proportion of
districts in which the group searches in equilibrium is
α∗ → min
{
1
2pq
,
1
2(1− pq)
}
.
Proof. Assume the group searches in k districts, and let (as before) ∆Gk be
the expected gain from searching in one additional district.
First, notice that as n → ∞, C1 in Proposition 1 is satisﬁed. Thus, by
Lemma 3, if max{h, k − h} < n−1
2
, then ∆Gk > 0 and the group has an
incentive to increase k.
Second, if k − h ≥ n−1
2
, case 3 or case 1 occurs, implying that ∆Gk =
G∗(Esr, rC¯\{i})−G∗(rC¯) < 0. Alternatively, if h ≥ n−12 , case 4 or (with a 1/n
chance) case 1 occurs, so that ∆Gk =
1
n
G∗(Esr, rC¯\{a})−G∗(rC¯) < 0.
h, of course, is a random variable distributed binomially B(k, pq), with
E[h] = pq k. As n →∞ the Central Limit Theorem implies that h
k
a.s.−→ pq ⇔
h
n
a.s.−→ pq k
n
= pq α.
Suppose by contradiction that the optimal proportion of districts in which
the group searches for large n, α∗ = k
∗(n)
n
< min
{
1
2pq
, 1
2(1−pq)
}
. Then for
arbitrarily small ε, ε′ > 0 there exists an n, large, such that ε, ε′ < 1
n
and
such that h
n
≤ pq α∗+ε < 1
2
and k
∗(n)−h
n
≤ α∗−pq α∗+ε′ < 1
2
with probability
one. For such n ∆Gk∗ > 0; thus, the group has an incentive to increase k,
and α∗ cannot be optimal.
Suppose on the other hand, also by contradiction, that for large n α∗ >
min
{
1
2pq
, 1
2(1−pq)
}
. Then for some small ε, ε′ > 0 there exists an n, large,
such that h
n
≥ pq α∗ − ε > 1
2
and k−h
n
≥ α∗ − pq α∗ − ε′ > 1
2
with probability
one. For such n ∆Gk < 0. Thus, the group has an incentive to decrease k,
and α∗ is not optimal.
It follows that α∗ ∈
[
min
{
1
2pq
, 1
2(1−pq)
}
±max{ε, ε′}
]
for large n, where
ε, ε′ are arbitrarily small.
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Figure 1: Optimal search strategy without vote of conﬁdence procedure
The optimal search strategy—and thus the optimal number of districts—
depends, as Proposition 2 shows, on the parameters of the search. Figure 1
shows the optimal proportion of search districts α∗ for a large legislature as
a function of pq. As we observed earlier, the group optimally searches in at
least one-half of all districts and (generically) never in all districts.
In the congressional system, interest groups can actively seek to aﬀect
the composition of policy coalition. Since the agenda setter and the interest
group’s interests are aligned, the group can aﬀect policy by identifying “high
demand” districts. Negative search results do not aﬀect the policy negatively
since they can be externalized, to some degree, to non-majority members.
Thus, interest groups have an incentive to provide policy-relevant information
that allows the agenda setter—or other leaders—to construct most favorable
policy coalitions.
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4 Lobbying a Legislature With Vote of Con-
ﬁdence Procedure
Policy making in a parliamentary system is characterized by a high degree
of cohesion within the governing coalition. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998)
show how this voting cohesion can be induced by the vote of conﬁdence
procedure, since coalition partners derive beneﬁts being in the government
only if the governing coalition is maintained. We show that this voting
cohesion reduces an interest group’s incentive to provide information.
Government membership is valuable. In a ﬁrst step and to keep the model
as simple as possible we assume in this section that this value is exogenously
given and that members of the governing coalition lose the beneﬁt b if the
government is dissolved. In Section 5 we derive the value of b in a simple
dynamic policy game.
Our focus is on the policy making process and lobbying, and we are less
concerned with the coalition formation stage; we thus simply assume that
Nature chooses a governing coalition M and a proposer, a ∈ M . a proposes
a policy vector and decides whether or not to attach a vote of conﬁdence to
the proposal. To simplify the analysis, we assume that |M | = n−1
2
, i.e. the
governing coalition is a minimum majority.6
By attaching a vote of conﬁdence to policy g the proposer can exploit the
coalition partners’ incentive of maintaining the governing coalition. When b
is large enough the proposer proposes a policy that receives the support from
the members of the governing coalition and extracts the surplus b. When b
is small, the proposer may be better oﬀ choosing the best policy coalition
C, irrespective of M . Let C ⊂ N denote the best policy coalition that
constitutes a majority. From the previous section we know that C will never
be a super majority, i.e. |C| = n−1
2
. If the proposer seeks support from policy
coalition C = M , she will not attach a conﬁdence vote to the proposal in
order not to risk the dissolution of the government, and b remains unaﬀected
6An alternative assumption would be to let M be of any size, but assume that a vote
of conﬁdence requires unanimity among the coalition partners.
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by the outcome of the vote on the proposal in this case.
The proposer’s problem when seeking support from M by attaching a
vote of conﬁdence is,
max
g
raga − 12nG2 + b
s.t. rigi − 12nG2 + b ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ M
gi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ N.
The solution, G∗+v, in terms of the aggregate amount of public good to this
problem is given by
G∗+v =


n∑
i∈M
1
Eri
if b ≤ n
2
r2a
n ra otherwise.
The ﬁrst row is the case where the proposal makes the majority partners
indiﬀerent between supporting or not. However, if b is very large, it is possible
that the rent transfer from coalition partners to the proposer through an
increase of public good in the proposer’s district is so ineﬃcient that the
proposer prefers to leave the coalition partners with some rent in equilibrium.
This is captured by the second row in the deﬁnition of G∗+v.
If the proposer instead chooses support from C without invoking the
conﬁdence procedure, her problem is identical to the one in Section 3:
max
g
raga − 12nG2 + b
s.t. rigi − 12nG2 ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ C
gi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ N.
The aggregate solution G∗−v to the problem without the use of the conﬁdence
procedure is
G∗−v =
n∑
i∈C¯
1
Eri
.
Proposition 3 below states the main result of this section, namely that
an interest group’s incentive to engage in information provision is smaller in
the parliamentary system than in the congressional system.
To derive the proposition, the following lemma will be useful.
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Lemma 4. If in all possible equilibria the proposer chooses support for the
policy proposal from the governing coalition M by attaching the vote of con-
ﬁdence, then the interest group is strictly better oﬀ not searching for infor-
mation.
Proof. Suppose a seeks support for her proposal from the governing coalition
M , and the group searches in k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} districts. Let K be the set
of districts in which the group searches and B = K ∩M (possibly empty).
Denote by ErB the vector of expected valuations for the districts in B after
the group has sent messages to the proposer (i.e., each element in ErB will
be either r or Esr). The allocation of public good the proposer chooses is
given by
G∗(ErB, E◦rM\B). (∗)
Now consider that the group searches in k+1 districts, by adding district
j. In case 1, j ∈ M , which implies the expected allocation
pq G∗(r, ErB, E◦rM\(B∪{j})) + (1− pq)G∗(Esr, ErB, E◦rM\(B∪{j})) (∗′)
By concavity and Jensen’s inequality (∗′) is less than (∗).
In case 2, j ∈ M , in which case the allocation is not aﬀected by the search
(i.e., as given in (∗)).
Since both cases have a positive probability of occurring, the expected
allocation after searching in k + 1 districts is less than for searching in k
districts. Since k is any number between 0 . . . n − 1, this means that the
group is strictly worse oﬀ searching in any district.
Lemma 4 builds on the following fact. If the policy coalition is ﬁxed
and cannot be aﬀected by the interest group’s message, then searching in a
coalition member’s district is a risky undertaking for the interest group: If the
search is successful, it increases the total amount of public good provided;
if it is not successful, it reduces the amount. As shown in Lemma 1 the
proposer’s optimal allocation of public good G∗ is concave in the districts’
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valuations for the good; thus, by Jensen’s inequality, the expected allocation
is lower than if the group does not search.
We are now ready to state our main result. Proposition 3 establishes
the conditions under which a proposer chooses support from M only, leaving
interest groups with no incentive to search.
Proposition 3. The vote of conﬁdence procedure reduces the interest group’s
incentive to search for information. In particular, the group never searches
if
b ≥ r (r − r) 2n
n2 − 1 ≡ b¯ (5)
Proof. After the lobby has delivered its message two situations can arise.
Either the proposer selects as policy coalition the group of legislators with the
highest expected ri, C, or she proposes a policy supported by the members
of the governing coalition M .
In the former case the lobby has the same beneﬁt from its search activity
as in the case without vote of conﬁdence procedure (congressional case).
In the latter case, when the proposer chooses support from M , the lobby
group’s beneﬁt from searching can never be higher than in the congressional
case, since M may include legislators who ex-post do not have the highest
expected ri. It remains to show that b ≥ b¯ is a suﬃcient condition for the
proposer to choose a policy supported by M independently of the information
transmitted by the lobby.
To show this, consider the most adverse case, where the proposer has the
largest incentive to include legislators from outside the governing coalition.
This case occurs when the lobby has delivered messages µi = r for all i /∈ M
and µi = r for all i ∈ M \ {a}.
If the proposer chooses support from the governing coalition she will link
the policy to a vote of conﬁdence. The aggregate amount of public good will
be,
G∗(Era, rM) =
n
(m− 1)1
r
+ 1
Era
.
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The utility, u+va , of the proposer in this case is,
u+va =
n
2
Er2ar
(m− 1)Era + r +
Era
r
(m− 1)b + b.
If the proposer instead chooses support from outside the governing coali-
tion, she will not use the vote of conﬁdence procedure and the aggregate
public good will be,
G∗(Era, r) =
n
(m− 1)1
r
+ 1
Era
.
The utility, u−va , of the proposer in this case is,
u−va =
n
2
Er2ar
(m− 1)Era + r + b.
The proposer, therefore, prefers to ﬁnd support within the governing
coalition if u+va − u−va ≥ 0, which reduces to,
(m− 1) b ≥ n r Era
2
[
r
(m− 1)Era + r −
r
(m− 1)Era + r
]
(6)
Since r
(m−1)Era+r <
r
mEra
and r
(m−1)Era+r >
r
mEra
we get an upper bound on
the right hand side of equation (6) by substituting these latter terms (note
that this is a least upper bound as m →∞), which reduces to
b ≥ n r(r − r)
2 m(m− 1) = r (r − r)
2n
n2 − 1 .
Proposition 3 establishes that an interest group has no incentive to lobby
a legislature with the vote of conﬁdence procedure than when b, the value of
keeping the government in oﬃce, is large enough. The reason is that with
b ≥ b¯, the proposer always chooses policy that is supported by members of
the governing coalition. Thus, following the logic of Lemma 4, the interest
group has no incentive to search for information.
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Comparing the results from Sections 3 and 4 we observe that policy coali-
tions are formed diﬀerently in the parliamentary and the congressional sys-
tems, and as a consequence they provide private interest groups with very
diﬀerent incentives to lobby. When the proposer has the ability to link the
policy proposal to a vote of conﬁdence, she creates voting cohesion among
the governing coalition, thus reducing the beneﬁt of lobbying with policy
relevant information. If the voting cohesion is suﬃciently strong, then the
interest groups abstains entirely from searching.
5 The Value of Government Membership
In the previous section we assumed that the continuation value for being a
member of the majority coalition is exogenously given. In this section we
derive the value of the government coalition in a simple dynamic version
of our policy game. We will show that the an interest group’s gain from
engaging in information provision is strictly higher in the absence of a vote
of conﬁdence procedure.
Assume that a legislature is in place for T policy periods and that a gov-
erning coalition M has been chosen by Nature. Each policy period deals with
a separate policy issue, and legislators’ preferences are not correlated across
issues. In addition, there is one interest group per policy issue confronting
the legislature in each period.
The timing within each policy period is as before,
1. The lobby group decides upon its search activity.
2. Nature chooses a proposer from the governing coalition M .
3. The lobby group delivers its message to the legislature.
4. Proposer chooses a policy allocation g. If available, the proposer also
decides upon the use of the conﬁdence procedure.
5. The legislature votes on the proposal. As before, if the proposal is
rejected and it is not linked to a vote of conﬁdence, then g = 0. If
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the conﬁdence procedure is invoked, then losing the vote forces the
government coalition to step down.
The only diﬀerence between the two legislative systems is the ability to
make a vote of conﬁdence in the parliament. For simplicity we assume that
each time the government steps down, Nature chooses a new government
coalition M by a random draw from the subset of 2N for which |M | ≥ n+1
2
.7
For notational convenience we number periods in reverse order, i.e. the last
policy period is period 1 and the ﬁrst period is period T.
To simplify matters further we assume that the legislature consists of
three legislators (n = 3) and that the governing coalition, M , consists of
exactly two legislators. In each policy period as long as the government is
in power, Nature designates one of these two legislators as the proposer (or
agenda setter), and the other as coalition partner. The third legislator, who
is not a member of the governing coalition, remains the minority legislator.
To distinguish between the three legislators (and the three districts) we use
subscripts a, cp and mi. Notice that in a given policy period the proposer
may choose to include the coalition partner or the minority legislator in a
policy coalition. Legislators’ preferences in each policy period are as in the
previous sections, with the exception that the the value of remaining in the
governing coalition, b, is derived endogenously.
Congress: No vote of conﬁdence
In the absence of the conﬁdence procedure there is no strategic link between
the policy periods.8 Thus, in any policy period the agenda setter includes the
legislator with the highest expected marginal utility of the regional good in
the policy coalition and proposes a distribution of the public good according
to equation (3).
7Alternatively we could assume, as Diermeier and Feddersen do, that legislators’ pref-
erences over coalition partners change randomly between each time a government coalition
forms.
8Note that potential reciprocal arrangements between legislators break down in the last
period and thus unravel by backward induction.
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In each policy period the lobby strictly prefers to search for information.
This is easily seen from the fact that the expected value of searching in the
minority district relative to not searching is strictly positive: with probability
pq the lobby ﬁnds evidence for a high marginal utility of the good, which
implies that the proposer chooses the minority district as a majority partner.
If the lobby does not ﬁnd this positive evidence, the proposer chooses the
coalition partner as majority partner and the aggregate good will be as high
as if the lobby had not searched. The following lemma, whose proof is in the
appendix, veriﬁes that this search strategy is optimal in the congressional
system.
Lemma 5. In the dynamic policy game without vote of conﬁdence proce-
dure (congressional system), in each policy period the interest group’s unique
optimal search strategy is to search in the minority district alone.
The Lemma conﬁrms that the incentives for the lobby group do not
change in the congressional system for the dynamic version of the game.
Introducing the conﬁdence procedure
In proposition 4 below we state, that when the proposer can link its policy
proposal to a vote of conﬁdence and there are suﬃciently many policy periods
remaining, then a lobby has less incentive to search than without the conﬁ-
dence procedure. In particular, we show that the lobby does not gain from
using the search strategy that is optimal in the congressional system. Hence,
the expected gain from searching, and thus the lobby’s incentive to search,
is strictly smaller (possible negative) than in the congressional system.
We show the result by solving the model backwards from period 1.
Date 1: The continuation value in period 1, b1, for a member of the
governing coalition is obviously zero as the government needs to step down
for sure at the end of the period. Thus, the proposer simply chooses the
coalition partner with the highest expected r as in the case without the vote
of conﬁdence procedure. As shown in Lemma 5, the lobby’s unique optimal
search strategy is to search in the minority district alone. The expected
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beneﬁts for the proposer, u1a, the coalition partner, u
1
cp, and the minority
legislator are, u1mi, are
u1a = pq u˜
a(E◦r, r) + (1− pq)u˜a(E◦r, E◦r),
u1cp = −pq3 G∗(E◦r, r),
u1mi = −1−pq3 G∗(E◦r, E◦r).
where u˜a(ri, rj) ≡ 32
r2i rj
ri+rj
is the proposer’s one period utility from the optimal
policy proposal, and G∗ is given in equation (2). Note that the expected
beneﬁts for the minority and coalition partner are simply their expected tax
share whenever they do not receive any public good allocations. The proposer
has no incentive to attach the conﬁdence vote to his proposal in period 1.
Date t > 1: The continuation value bt for the members of the governing
coalition arises from their increased likelihood of being the proposer in the
next period. If the government remains in power at date t, each of the two
legislators in the governing coalition has probability 1/2 of being the proposer
at date t − 1. This probability drops to 1/3 if the government is dissolved
and newly formed.
In period t the lobby has the highest incentive to engage in information
provision whenever it can use its preferred search strategy from the congres-
sional case and the proposer is willing to change the majority composition in
response to the message received from the lobby. Assume this has been the
case up to period t − 1. The following lemma describes the evolution in bt
and the expected utilities in period t:
Lemma 6. Suppose in all periods 1, . . . , t the lobbies search in the minority
district only, and that the proposer includes the minority district in the policy
coalition if and only if the lobby provides positive evidence for rmi = r. Then
for t > 1,
bt = h(t)(u1a + u
1
cp)− k(t)u1mi,
uta = [1 + (2− pq)h(t)]u1a + (2− pq)h(t)u1cp − (2− pq)k(t)u1mi,
utcp = pq h(t)u
1
a + [1 + pq h(t)]u
1
cp − pq k(t)u1mi,
utmi = t u
1
mi,
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where
h(t) ≡ 1
2
t−1∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i
and k(t) ≡
t−1∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i
(t− i).
Proof. The proof is by induction.
Date 2. The continuation value for each member of the coalition is,
b2 = 1
6
(u1a + u
1
cp)− 13u1mi = h(2)(u1a + u1cp)− k(2)u1mi.
By assumption the lobby searches only in the minority district and the pro-
poser is willing to include this district in a policy majority if µmi = r. Then,
with probability pq the proposer picks Lmi as a policy coalition partner with-
out invoking the conﬁdence procedure. With probability 1− pq the proposer
uses Lcp to support the policy and extracts the rent (continuation value) by
attaching a conﬁdence vote. Whichever legislator is picked as policy partner
receives reservation utility zero. Thus the expected utilities for the proposer,
the coalition partner and the minority legislator are,
u2a = u
1
a + (2− pq)b2
= [1 + (2− pq)h(2)]u1a + (2− pq)h(2)u1cp − (2− pq)k(2)u1mi,
u2cp = u
1
cp + pqb
2 = pq h(2)u1a + [1 + pq h(2)]u
1
cp − pq k(2)u1mi,
u2mi = 2u
1
mi.
Date t > 2. Assume the lemma true for all periods up to t − 1. The
continuation value for each coalition partner in period t is,
bt = 1
6
(ut−1a + u
t−1
cp )− 13ut−1mi
= 1
6
(1 + 2 h(t− 1)) (u1a + u1cp)−
(
1
3
k(t− 1) + 1
3
(t− 1)) u1mi
=
1
6
(
1 + 2
t−2∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i )
(u1a + u
1
cp)−
(
1
3
t−2∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i
(t− 1− i) + 1
3
(t− 1)
)
u1mi
= h(t)(u1a + u
1
cp)− k(t)u1mi
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Given bt the expected payoﬀs for the legislators are,
uta = u
1
a + (2− pq)bt
= (1 + (2− pq)h(t))u1a + (2− pq)h(t)u1cp − (2− pq)k(t)u1mi,
utcp = u
1
cp + pqb
t = pq h(t)u1a + (1 + pq h(t))u
1
cp − pq k(t)u1mi,
utmi = t u
1
mi.
Suppose now that the lobby in period t provides positive evidence for a
high valuation in the minority district, µmi = r¯. The proposer is willing to
forego the beneﬁt of the conﬁdence procedure if and only if,
u˜a(Er, r) ≥ u˜a(E◦r, E◦r) + bt. (7)
Since umi < 0, h(t) is increasing and bounded, and k(t) grows without
bound, we we observe that bt increases without bound as t increases; therefore
the proposer will always prefer using the conﬁdence procedure and require
the support from the coalition partner whenever t large enough. Let t˜ be
the maximum t for which (7) holds, and deﬁne t∗ = min{t˜, T}. Thus, for
t ≤ t∗ the proposer is willing to graft the coalition opportunistically when
she receives information from the lobby group.
When t > t∗, the proposer enforces voting cohesion among the govern-
ment coalition. Hence, the lobby may either choose another search strategy
that is able to aﬀect the composition of the majority or abstain from search-
ing. In the former case, Lemma 5 proves these strategies have lower expected
gain for the lobby group. We, therefore, arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 4. For all policy periods from date T to t∗+1 an interest group’s
expected gain from searching and information provision is strictly smaller in
the parliamentary system than in the congressional system.
In the last t∗ policy periods the two types of legislature provide an interest
group with the same expected gain from information provision.
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The proposition implies that the interest groups’ incentive to engage in
information search is strictly smaller in legislatures with the conﬁdence pro-
cedure than in legislatures without this procedure, for periods t > t∗. Clearly,
the relevance of this result depends on the size of t∗. Simulations show that
for a large range of plausible parameter values t∗ = 1,9 that is, the two leg-
islative structures provide diﬀerent incentives for lobby groups to engage in
information search in all but the ﬁnal policy period.
6 Discussion
Our model of lobbying legislatures for favorable policy has shown that the
incentive interest groups have to lobby depends, not too surprisingly, on
the legislative structure in which the group operates. The results roughly
correspond to the empirical observation that lobbying is far more active in
the U.S. Congress than in European parliamentary systems.
The distinguishing feature we have identiﬁed between the parliamentary
and congressional systems is the ability of parliamentary leaders to induce
voting cohesion through the use of the conﬁdence procedure. On the other
hand, leaders in Congress craft legislative coalitions according to the policy
preferences of legislators for each policy issue at a time. As the analysis
has shown, it is this feature that provides interest groups with inﬂuence
by passing on information that helps the agenda setter identify the most
favorable supporters for the proposal.
In the absence of this coalitional ﬂexibility, as in parliamentary systems
when the value of government membership is signiﬁcant, the proposer has
nothing to learn about the composition of the winning coalition. Therefore,
the only way the interest group can aﬀect outcomes is by providing informa-
9For example let r = 1 then ∀ q, p ∈ [0, 1] and ∀ r ≤ 2, t∗ = 1.
For smaller variation between districts the result is even stronger. In this numerical
example, r ≤ 1.4 is a suﬃcient condition for b1 > up(r, r)− up(r, r), which is the highest
gain a proposer can ever achieve from breaking the governing coalition. Thus, in this case
the lobbies will never search in any policy period before the ﬁnal one, since the composition
of the policy majority is not aﬀected by any transmitted information.
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tion about a given set of districts. As we show, it is a feature of Bayesian
updating that the ex ante (uninformed) beliefs are a weighted average of the
posterior (informed) beliefs. Therefore, the degree to which the proposer’s
beliefs are inﬂuenced by favorable information as well as the potential detri-
ment from the failure to do so cancel each other out in expectation. More-
over, since the proposer’s reaction function is concave in her expectation,
the group is strictly worse oﬀ trying to lobby a proposer who is wedded to
the districts she needs to favor. Thus, without the ﬂexibility to customize
winning coalitions there is no scope for informational lobbying.
An interesting sideline to our results is that lobbying in the congres-
sional system always yields coalitions of “high demand” districts, i.e., dis-
tricts whose preference for the public good are above the average and who are
willing to support the agenda setter’s over-provision of public good to some
districts. In this regard the model suggests that the congressional system is
more prone to ineﬃcient allocation of policy than the parliamentary system
(although this assessment lies beyond the scope of our model for the present
time).
A variation of our model could relax the assumption that the interest
group is organized at the national level and beneﬁts from the provision of the
public good in any district. An interest group’s beneﬁt is often localized, and
it may have a particular knowledge of the local incidence of the public good
that it might want to convey to the legislators. First results along these lines
indicate that if interest groups are local, they compete for inclusion of their
district in the majority by providing information. Since such an incentive is
absent in the parliamentary system, our general result prevails and may even
be ampliﬁed.
In the present paper we assume that the lobby’s search activity is observ-
able for the legislature; this allow us to highlight the mechanism of Bayesian
inference engendered by the group’s search for favorable information. In
practice, legislators cannot be expected to monitor interest group activities
all too closely. However, if we maintain the standard assumption of Bayesian
games, namely that players are rational and make the best (equilibrium)
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predictions about other players’ unobserved behavior and that players’ ac-
tions are optimal given their beliefs, then the main observation10from the
present analysis obtains when the search activity is unobservable, albeit in
a qualiﬁed form: the congressional system provides an interest group with
a greater incentive to lobby via information search than the parliamentary
system. The principal diﬀerence is that when the search activity is not ob-
servable, searching itself does not induce the proposer to revise her beliefs,
so that the activity itself does not impose a Bayesian cost. Instead, the pro-
poser infers whether or not the group has an incentive to search and forms
her expectations accordingly. Thus, in equilibrium the failure to report a
positive ﬁnding still carries the Bayesian updating cost.
Some observers of lobbying argue that interest groups in Europe far more
actively lobbying bureaucrats rather than legislators, relative to their US
counterparts. The standard explanation is that legislators are less important
in the design of policy. Our analysis provides a diﬀerent explanation for this
observation: Lacking the ability to inﬂuence policy coalitions and outcomes in
the legislature, interest groups focus their attention on the implementation
of policy. Further empirical work will need to shed light on the merits of
either explanation.
10The following argument is developed in Bennedsen and Feldmann 1999.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Since the lobby cannot distinguish between the proposer and the coali-
tion partner when it picks its search strategy, there are ﬁve search strategies
with diﬀerent expected values. With a slight abuse of notation we can write
these strategies as s1 (one coalition member’s district), s3 (the minority dis-
trict), s12 (both coalition members’ districts), s13 (one coalition member’s
district and the minority district), s123 (all three districts). Similarly, we
write the lobby’s expected value (relative to not searching) from using these
strategies as V1, V3, V12, V13, and V123.
V3 = pq(G∗(r, E◦r)−G∗(E◦r, E◦r)) > 0,
V1 = 12(pq G
∗(r, E◦r) + (1− pq)G∗(Esr, E◦r))
+ 12(pq G
∗(r, E◦r) + (1− pq)G∗(E◦r, E◦r))−G∗(E◦r, E◦r) < V3,
V13 = 12
[
(pq)2G∗(r, r) + pq(1− pq)(G∗(Esr, r) + G∗(r, E◦r)) + (1− pq)2G∗(Esr, E◦r)
]
+ 12
[
(pq + (1− pq)pq)G∗(r, E◦r) + (1− pq)2G∗(E◦r, Esr)
]−G∗(E◦r, E◦r)
< 12 [pq G
∗(E◦r, r) + (1− pq)G∗(E◦r, E◦r)]
+ 12 [pq G
∗(r, E◦r) + (1− pq)G∗(E◦r, E◦r)]−G∗(E◦r, E◦r) = V3,
V12 = (pq)2G∗(r, r) + pq(1− pq)(G∗(r, E◦r) + G∗(r, Esr))
+ (1− pq)2G∗(Esr, E◦r)−G∗(E◦r, E◦r)
< pq G∗(r, E◦r) + (1− pq)G∗(E◦r, E◦r)−G∗(E◦r, E◦r) = V3,
V123 = pq[pq(2− pq)G∗(r, r) + (1− pq)2G∗(r, Esr)]
+ (1− pq)[pq(2− pq)G∗(Esr, r) + (1− pq)2G∗(Esr, Esr)]−G∗(E◦r, E◦r).
< pq[pq G∗(r, r) + (1− pq)G∗(r, E◦r)]
+ (1− pq)[pq G∗(Esr, r) + (1− pq)G∗(Esr, E◦r)]−G∗(E◦r, E◦r).
< pq G∗(E◦r, r) + (1− pq)G∗(E◦r, E◦r)−G∗(E◦r, E◦r) = V3.
where each inequality (except the ﬁrst) follows from Jensen’s inequality and
from concavity of G∗(·).
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